Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction
1. Background: The Ethiopian Army 1941–1974
1.1. Organization of the Army
1.2. Training and Equipment
1.3. Operations
2. Recruitment, Training and Equipment 1977–1991
2.1. Recruitment/Conscription and Training
2.2. Equipment
3. Structure, Logistics and Command and Control 1977–1991
3.1. Organization of the Army
3.2. Logistics
3.3. Command and Control
3.3.1. The Triangular Command
3.3.2. The 1989 Abortive Coup
4. Military Intelligence 1977–1991
4.1. Organization of the Military Intelligence Department and its Activities
4.2. Some Limited Achievements of the Military Intelligence Department
4.3. Major Intelligence Failures
4.4. Counter-Intelligence
5. Operations: The Somali-Ethiopian War 1977–1978
6. Operations: Counter-Insurgency Campaigns in Northern Ethiopia
6.1. The Battles for Naqfa 1976–1986
6.2. The Afabét and Sheré Debacles
6.3. From Sheré to Karra Mesheg: Worsening Military Reverses
6.4. The Last Days of the Army
7. The Revolutionary Army and its External Patrons
7.1 The Revolution and the Revolutionary Army
7.2. The Role of Soviet Military Advisers
8. Conclusions: Why did the Army Lose the War?
8.1. Loss of Public Support
8.2. Failure to Apply the Right Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics
8.3. Intelligence Failure
8.4. Problems of Command and Control
8.5. Conscription, Training and Organizational Problems
8.6. War Weariness and Disillusionment
Endnotes
Bibliography
Appendices
